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Commentary: What we’ve learnt about the WHO from the Ebola outbreak  
 
Abstract: 
WHO’s reputation has become irrefutably damaged during the Ebola outbreak, with the general 
consensus in the global health community that it fell short of its leadership responsibilities. This 
commentary offers a brief synopsis of the WHO’s role during the outbreak and suggests that the 
disease outbreak demonstrates tension that exists between the organisations normative and 
operational role in health crises. Whilst the WHO did offer some normative leadership during 
the Ebola outbreak, as per its constitution, it did not provide an operational response, albeit 
without a mandate to do so. This division between the normative and operational was further 
highlighted by the discrepancy between what the global community expects the WHO to do in a 
health emergency, and what it is able to do with financial and organisational constraints. Finally, 
the commentary considers the introduction of the WHO Health Emergency Programme, but 
suggests that this too suffers from the same structural concerns as the whole organisation which 
need to be addressed if the WHO is to continue in the role the global health community expects 
it to play as both a normative and operational leader in global disease control.   
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Ebola  
 
The Ebola epidemic in West-Africa (2014-5) was catastrophic. Previously successful infection 
control mechanisms for haemorrhagic fevers were not enacted quickly enough, or to the extent 
required to bring the outbreak under control. The outbreak soon overwhelmed epidemic 
response mechanisms at national, regional and global levels. Piot1 (amongst others) has suggested 
that a perfect storm of factors contributed to the scale of disaster caused by this outbreak. These 
factors included the unprecedented size of the outbreak, the lack of sufficiently trained 
personnel, limited resources, weak national health systems, the spread of the outbreak to urban 
settings, a time lag between the initial appearance of the pathogen and the reporting of it to the 
national and international communities, the highly porous international borders, mis-trust of 
government and health officials, the virus’ first appearance in West Africa, an exodus of 
international health providers and a structural failure of global health governance2.   The result 
was over 28,000 cases and 11,000 deaths totalling more than all previous outbreaks3.  Beyond the 
alarming number of cases, the outbreak has had a considerable socio-economic impact on the 
lives of millions of survivors and unaffected people, through the indirect consequences of lack of 
routine healthcare facilities, disruption to routine education provision, decline in employment 
rates and food insecurity4.  
2 
 
 
Since the outbreak, several reviews have sought to understand the failures which contributed to 
the inability of the national and international communities to stop the spread of the virus and to 
avoid the humanitarian disaster which unfolded5. All reviews attribute some blame to the World 
Health Organization (WHO) for its delay to take action and for a lack of an operational response 
in the outbreak. However, whilst the WHO made some pivotal mistakes, as it itself admits6, the 
outbreak exposed tensions between the normative and operational role of the WHO, and 
furthermore between what the WHO is able to do (suffering from financial and organisational 
constraints), and what the global community expects the WHO to do.  
 
Key moments for the WHO during the outbreak 
 
The WHO first received news of the virus’ emergence in March 20147. In response, the 
organization sent field epidemiologists to West Africa, who established initial response efforts 
such as contact tracing, laboratory support and infection control mechanisms to the outbreak, 
mirroring that which they had implemented in previous Ebola outbreaks. Yet, it has been 
suggested that those sent had little knowledge of Ebola and had even broken WHO protocols 
for disease outbreak management8. Kamradt-Scott9 has suggested that the many criticisms 
received by the WHO of their initial activity may not be a fair representation of the 
organisation’s response to the outbreak, in that it was its largest deployment of field 
epidemiologists (112 experts by May 201410) who acted commensurate with the level of the 
threat which was believed to be posed by the disease at that time11. Vitally, however, the WHO 
failed to take into account the range of factors which contributed to Ebola transmission, and 
provided an inadequate response to the second wave of the outbreak appearing in May 201412 
(p.7). As the organization has suggested its own shortcomings at this time were numerous:  
 
The initial response was slow and insufficient, we were not aggressive in alerting the world, our surge capacity was 
limited, we did not work effectively in coordination with other partners, there were shortcomings in risk 
communication, and there was confusion of role and responsibilities at the three levels [Headquarters, Regional 
Office and Country Offices] of the organisation13 
 
With mounting public pressure14, the WHO finally declared Ebola a Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern (PHEIC) on 8th August 2014. This PHEIC occurred 5 months after the 
WHO first received information about the Ebola threat, by which point there had already been 
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1711 cases and 932 deaths15. Such delay undoubtedly contributed to the unprecedented scale of 
the outbreak. It has been suggested that the delay in declaring a PHEIC was due in part to 
placating delicate political and economic situations in West Africa16 (p.1307) highlighting the 
tenuous position the WHO occupies in the global health mosaic. After the PHEIC declaration, 
the WHO sought to coordinate and mobilise the necessary response to eliminate disease spread. 
However, funds allocated for emergency response had been drastically reduced in previous 
years17 (p.6), and despite the launch of a WHO Roadmap in August 2014, strategizing the end of 
the epidemic within 6-9 months, a coordinated international response with WHO at the helm 
failed to materialise18 with the outbreak rapidly developing into a humanitarian emergency.  
 
However, after the initial errors in downplaying of the outbreak19, the WHO did maintain 
continued activity in tackling Ebola. The WHO documents its role in training healthcare workers 
and burial teams in infection control, community engagement activities and providing 
epidemiological data20. Furthermore, the organisation published numerous technical guidance 
documents, hosted a series of meetings on vaccine options, developed diagnostic tools and 
expanded laboratory services21 (p.1309). Yet none of these activities provided direct patient care, 
strategic managerial oversight or the infection control that the outbreak response needed. 
Ultimately, due to a vacuum of international leadership in the operational response (which 
several in the international community expected the WHO to perform) the patient care, infection 
control and management was left to others, including MSF, a new UN body (UNMEER) and the 
even domestic and international militaries22.  
 
Tensions between the Normative and Operational Role of WHO 
 
As the only United Nations (UN) agency tasked exclusively with health, the WHO conceives 
itself to be:  
 
 “the directing and coordinating authority in international health work”’23 (p2).  
 
Moreover, for disease outbreaks, the WHO acknowledges:  
 
“a central and historic responsibility [for the WHO] has been the management of the global regime for the control 
of the international spread of disease”24 (p1).  
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From such a constitutional position, it is unsurprising that the global community looked to 
WHO, as the apex of the global health landscape, to mount a response for the outbreak. Yet, 
these tasks that the WHO assumes are both normative in function and they do not prescribe the 
WHO an operational role to provide the on-the-ground response at time of crisis. Lee25 
describes the work of the WHO as a leader in global health, shaping research and knowledge, 
setting norms and standards, providing technical support and monitoring health situations (p. 
20). As McInnes highlights (p1305)26: 
 
“The operational ability to act in a crisis is notable by its omission.”  
 
As has been noted by Gostin & Friedman, Yach and McInnes27, this distinction between 
normative and operational roles of the WHO has been missed in several of the analyses of the 
WHO’s failure to respond to the Ebola outbreak.  
 
Normatively, the WHO did respond to the outbreak, through the declaration of the PHEIC 
(albeit it delayed), the production of technical advice, community engagement activities, the 
sharing of epidemiological data, support with the development of vaccines and healthcare 
worker training activities. It could even be argued that the framing of the disease by the global 
health community and the media as a security threat, and the ultra-securitised response of 
deploying domestic and international militaries is a consequence of WHO’s normative agenda to 
encourage a discourse of global health security for infectious disease control more broadly. 
 
However, these normative achievements have been overlooked by the global community’s 
assessments of the WHO’s activity during the outbreak, and instead the focus has been on the 
operational, notably that the WHO did not provide a sufficient operational response to the 
Ebola outbreak. Yet, this global community (including NGOs, civil society and the media) who 
had such high expectations for action are not the member states which the WHO represents and 
it is interesting to observe that the affected states (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) have not 
voiced such criticisms about the organisation. As such, there appears to have been a mismatch 
between the expectations placed on the WHO by the global community, and what the WHO is 
mandated (and able) to do.  
 
As WHO Director General Margaret Chan stated: 
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“It was a fantasy to think of the WHO as a first responder ready to lead the fight against a deadly outbreak”28 
 
WHO works within a Westphalian system which expects states to provide a response to health 
needs of their citizens29 with the WHO providing (normative) technical advice and 
recommendations to support state activity. As the affected states suffered from chronically 
underfunded, weak health systems and had not met their commitments to the International 
Health Regulations (2005)30, they were unable to respond on their own. The WHO did not have 
operational authority or resources to respond on their behalf, with this role being assumed by 
other actors in the global health landscape better equipped and resourced to do so, including 
MSF (offering over 4000 staff and spending over EUR 96million to the response effort) and 
domestic and international militaries (deploying over 5000 personnel at a cost of US$2billion)31. .  
 
WHO Challenges 
 
Beyond the tension between the normative and operational role that the WHO should have 
played during the outbreak, the organisation currently does not have the capacity or 
organizational culture to deliver substantially on either goal (p.6/15)32. For the past two decades, 
the WHO has been in the process of reform, trying to address concerns of politics and priority 
setting, financing, governance, and managerial challenges. These institutional weaknesses further 
played a role in the WHO’s inability to lead the response to the Ebola outbreak.  
  
As suggested by Harman and Rushton33 leadership in global health is often driven by money and 
the ability to fund global health projects (p. 2). No agency can manage an outbreak either 
normatively or operationally when it controls only a small, depleted budget34 (p.1324). One of 
the key challenges the WHO has faced has been its precarious financing mechanisms35(p. 41), 
and notably the reduction of funds available to respond to an outbreak has been severely 
reduced36 . Divergence between the distribution and conditionalities of voluntary and assessed 
contributions mean that the WHO is limited in its ability to manage its own budget, with funding 
for health security apparently not being the focus of donor resources37 (p.41-2). This has been 
further compounded by the organisation’s policy of zero nominal growth resulting in even less 
purchasing power for its routine emergency activities38 (p.6). Even if the WHO had the remit to 
launch an operational response to the Ebola outbreak, without commensurate funding, the 
organization would not have been able to do so and therefore its budget constraints impacted 
the operational role which the global community expected. A second challenge for the 
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organisation is its own structure, with several commentators recognising the weaknesses in the 
organisation’s set up and tensions between headquarters, regional offices and country offices39. 
This has become even more important in the wake of Ebola, where differing activity emerged 
from the Geneva, AFRO regional and in-country offices without a coherent strategy40. 
 
WHO Health Emergencies Programme 
 
Moving on from the criticisms faced by the Ebola crisis will be hard for the WHO.  As 
suggested by the LSHTM-Harvard panel  
 
“the WHO is going to need fundamental reform to ensure that it can gain back the confidence from its members 
and the global health community.41”  
 
Importantly, the WHO has listened to the many concerns raised from its handling of the Ebola 
outbreak and the organisation has been revisiting its reform deliberations. Perhaps the most 
pertinent of these in the wake of Ebola has been the establishment of the new Health 
Emergencies Programme42. The focus of this activity is for the WHO to have a coordinating 
body for disease outbreaks with: 
 
“one programme, with one workforce, one budget, one set of rules and processes and one clear line of authority”.  
 
This programme offers a notable shift in the role of the WHO to date, explicitly including an 
operational role for the organisation in responding to health emergencies, when a state is unable 
to show the necessary operational leadership and management on their own43. Whilst the 
programme incorporates many of the functions that the WHO currently performs in disease 
management (such as through the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network) the inclusion 
of a mandate for operations is new, and a direct reflection of the criticisms it faced during the 
Ebola epidemic. Interestingly, this departure suggests that the WHO is evolving to meet the 
expectations placed on it by the global community, rather than maintain the focus on its role in 
‘coordinating and directing’ (i.e. the normative) as per its constitution44 (p. 2). The success of this 
initiative will only become apparent when the next global disease concern emerges. Yet, even 
despite the commitment at the World Health Assembly to operationalise a response to global 
health emergencies45, this programme is facing a funding gap between financial contributions and 
required funds for activity46. Accordingly, this new programme may suffer from the same 
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challenges as the organisation faces more broadly and any operational activity responding to 
health emergencies too may fail, or face criticism from the global community, given the ongoing 
lack of funds47.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The WHO’s reputation has become irrefutably damaged during the Ebola outbreak, with the 
general consensus in the global health community that it fell short of its leadership 
responsibilities48. This commentary has shown a synopsis of the WHO’s role in the epidemic, but 
has suggested that beyond the widespread criticism, we must remain reticent of the WHO’s 
abilities to respond to an outbreak from both a normative and operational perspective.  Whilst 
there is some evidence of the WHO performing a normative role during the crisis, albeit 
patchily, it is apparent that the global community also expected an operational response from the 
WHO. However, as the WHO was unable to provide this on-the-ground response in West-
Africa, this allowed other actors, notably MSF, militaries and UNMEER to perform this 
function. These efforts offered the global community further ammunition for their WHO 
criticisms.  
 
This does not mean that the WHO does not and should not strive to be a leader in global health. 
As stated by Gostin and Friedman in their analysis of leadership in the Ebola outbreak:  
 
A global health leader steers the overall direction of epidemic response, drives consensus towards a coherent strategy, 
ensures necessary functions are satisfied and coordinated many participators49 (p. 1903).  
 
Such a position equally suggests that there is a normative role for the WHO a leader in future 
outbreaks, without insinuating that there must be a simultaneous operational role. However, the 
WHO, through the creation of the Health Emergencies Programme, has sought to bridge the 
divide between the normative and operational, offering a response mechanism to future 
emergency disease concerns. Yet, the challenges that the WHO faces from financing and 
organizational divisions will not be overcome with this new programme, and therefore for the 
WHO to be in a position to actually respond to an outbreak, these fundamental structural 
concerns will need to be addressed comprehensively to allow the WHO the resources and power 
to perform the role that the global community expects.  
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